The session initiation protocol (SIP) is a powerful application-layer protocol which is used as a signaling one for establishing, modifying, and terminating sessions among participants. Authentication is becoming an increasingly crucial issue when a user asks to access SIP services. Hitherto, many authentication schemes have been proposed to enhance the security of SIP. In 2014, Arshad and Nikooghadam proposed an enhanced authentication and key agreement scheme for SIP and claimed that their scheme could withstand various attacks. However, in this paper, we show that Arshad and Nikooghadam's authentication scheme is still susceptible to key-compromise impersonation and trace attacks and does not provide proper mutual authentication. To conquer the flaws, we propose a secure and efficient ECC-based authentication scheme for SIP. Through the informal and formal security analyses, we demonstrate that our scheme is resilient to possible known attacks including the attacks found in Arshad et al. 's scheme. In addition, the performance analysis shows that our scheme has similar or better efficiency in comparison with other existing ECCbased authentication schemes for SIP.
Introduction
Multimedia service is one of the most important application classes of wired or wireless networks. The session initiation protocol (SIP) is one of the most important protocols supporting multimedia services since it could manage sessions including multimedia distribution, internet telephone calls, and internet multimedia conferences [1] . Authentication is an important security requirement when a user wants to access the SIP services. Therefore, the security of SIP [2] has received a lot of attention and the SIP authentication has become a crucial topic in modern multimedia services.
Up to now, various researches have focused on proposing a secure and efficient authenticated key agreement scheme to provide various aspects of security for SIP. In 2005, Yang et al. [3] indicated that the procedure of hyper text transport protocol (HTTP) digest authentication for SIP could not resist the offline password guessing and server-spoofing attacks. To resolve these problems, Yang et al. proposed an improved scheme based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Later on, Huang et al. [4] identified that Yang et al. 's protocol was insecure against the offline password guessing attack. To enhance the security of Yang et al. 's scheme, Huang et al. also presented an improved scheme. Later on, Jo et al. [5] demonstrated that Huang et al. 's scheme was still vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack. Based on Yang et al. 's study, Durlanik and Sogukpinar [6] proposed an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [7] based authentication scheme for SIP. Compared with other cryptosystems, ECC can achieve the same security with a smaller key size [8] . Therefore, the scheme proposed by Durlanik and Sogukpinar is considered to be more efficient than Yang et al. 's scheme. Later, Wu et al. [9] also proposed an authentication scheme for SIP using ECC. However, Yoon et al. [10] showed that both of Durlanik et al. 's scheme and Wu et al. 's scheme were susceptible to the offline password guessing, Denning-Sacco, and stolen verifier attacks. To overcome these weaknesses, Yoon et al. proposed an enhanced authentication scheme for SIP with more security. Unfortunately, Pu [11] showed that the scheme of Yoon et al. was still prone to the offline password guessing and replay attacks.
In order to reduce the high computational cost, Tsai [12] suggested an efficient authenticated key agreement scheme only adopting one-way hash functions and exclusive-or operations. Nevertheless, Tsai's scheme was still vulnerable to the offline password guessing attack [13, 14] . Yoon et al. [14] proposed an enhanced scheme to overcome weaknesses in Tsai's scheme. However, Xie [15] demonstrated that Yoon et al. 's scheme did not resist the stolen-verifier and offline password guessing attacks. Xie then proposed an improved scheme to overcome the weaknesses of Yoon et al. 's scheme. Nevertheless, Farash and Attari [16] discovered that Xie's scheme was still insecure against the impersonation and offline password guessing attacks. To enhance security, Farash and Attari presented an improved scheme to solve problems in Xie's scheme. Recently, Zhang et al. [17] proposed an efficient and flexible password authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP using smart card and claimed their protocol was secure against various attacks. However, Zhang et al. 's scheme suffers from the impersonation attack [18, 19] . To tackle the problem, Tu et al. [18] and Irshad et al. [19] , respectively, proposed their own improved authentication scheme based on Zhang et al. 's scheme. Unfortunately, Arshad and Nikooghadam [20] demonstrated that Irshad et al. 's scheme could not withstand the user impersonation attack. Arshad and Nikooghadam then proposed an enhancement of Irshad et al. 's scheme suffering from user impersonation attack and claimed that their scheme was immune to many known attacks.
In this study, we identify that the scheme by Arshad and Nikooghadam is insecure against key-compromise impersonation and trace attacks while it fails to provide proper mutual authentication. To conquer the mentioned weaknesses, we propose a robust and efficient authentication scheme using ECC. Through the informal and formal security analyses, we demonstrate that our scheme is resilient to possible known attacks including the attacks found in Arshad and Nikooghadam's scheme. In addition, the performance analysis shows that our scheme has similar or better efficiency in comparison with other related ECC-based authentication schemes for SIP.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some basic preliminaries and notations used in this paper. The review and security analysis of Arshad and Nikooghadam's scheme are shown in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 shows our proposed scheme. Section 6 analyzes our scheme's security. Section 7 shows the performance and functionality comparison among the proposed scheme and other related ones. Section 8 is a brief conclusion.
Preliminaries
In this section, some notations used in this paper are described in Section 2.1. We also recall the definitions of the hash function [21] and Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [7] which we use in the security proof of Arshad et al. 's scheme and our improved scheme.
Notations.
We use the notations that are listed below throughout the rest of the paper.
, : user and sever
,
: identity and password of ℎ(⋅): hash function , : secret key selected by and ⊕, ‖: exclusive-or operation and concatenation operation.
Hash Function.
A secure one-way hash function ℎ : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} takes an input as an arbitrary length binary string ∈ {0,1} * and outputs a binary string ℎ( ) ∈ {0, 1} . The probability of A in finding collision is defined as V
ECDLP.
In an elliptic curve cryptosystem, the elliptic curve equation is defined as the form of ( , ) : 2 = 3 + + (mod ) over a finite field , where , ∈ and 4 3 + 27 ̸ = 0(mod ). Given points , over ( , ), the ECDLP is to decide ∈ * such that = . The probability of A can solve the ECDLP which is defined as V
Review of Arshad and Nikooghadam's Scheme
In this section, we will review Arshad et al. 's authentication scheme for SIP. Their scheme is composed of three phases, which are registration, authentication, and password change.
Registration
(1) generates a random number , chooses his password , computes V = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ), and sends { , V } to .
(2) computes = ℎ( ‖ ) ⊕ V and stores it into his database.
Authentication
(1) generates a random number and computes = , where = is the public key of . Then, sends a message ( , ) to . 
Password Change
(1) selects a new random number and a new password and computes
(2) After receiving the message, computes
If it holds, continues to compute
and replaces with . Then, sends the message 
Cryptanalysis of Arshad and Nikooghadam's Scheme
In this section, we present the Arshad and Nikooghadam's scheme that is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation and trace attacks and does not provide proper mutual authentication. The following attacks are based on the assumptions that a malicious attacker A has completely monitored over the communication channel connecting and in login and authentication phase. So A can eavesdrop, modify, insert, or delete any messages transmitted via public channel [22] [23] [24] .
Key-Compromise Impersonation
Attack. Key-compromise impersonation attack means that A knows the long-term secret key of one participating entity and can impersonate the entity to other participating entities [25] . In Arshad et al. 's scheme, if 's secret key is compromised by A, he can launch a user impersonation attack as per the following steps.
(1) A compromises and steals the information { , } kept in 's database. He then generates a random number and computes = . Finally, he sends the forged message ( , ) to . Table 1) .
In this way, believes that he has successfully established the session key with whereas it is the adversary who is making fool of by imitating the legal user.
Trace Attack.
In the authentication phase of Arshad and Nikooghadam's scheme, the user sends the request messages containing the user's identity to without any protection. Since the user's identity is sent over an open communication channel, A may intercept the message using the assumed capability. With the user's identity , A can trace it to know what kind of services the user accesses and how long the user logins into the system. Since may have the system log recording what the user did, the user's privacy may be leaked. Furthermore, A may trace the user's location according to the user's IP address. The trace attack seriously invades the user's privacy and can be utilized to commit real crimes such as kidnappings.
Lack of Proper Mutual Authentication
(1) A eavesdrops the message ( , ), and then A generates a random number and computes = .
(2) A sends the forged message ( , ) to . Obviously, will accept A's request because does not verify the validity of the request message from . Then, generates a random number and computes
. Then, delivers the message ( , , ) to A who masquerades as a legal user.
(3) After receiving the message from , A computes = and checks whether = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ) is equal to the received . If it is true, A continues to compute
, where V = ℎ( ‖ ‖ ); both and are the forged password and random number. Then, A delivers the message ( , , ) to . In this condition, any one can forge and send the request message to , which leads to thinking is a cheater, whereas is actually an honest user. This obviously results in making great consumption of computing resources and communication resources.
Proposed Authentication Scheme for SIP
In this section, we propose a novel mutual authentication scheme based on ECC, which consists of three phases: registration, authentication, and password change.
Registration
(1) freely selects his password and his own secret key and generates a random number 1 . Then computes = ℎ( ‖ ) and submits { , 1 , } to through a secure channel.
(2) computes = ℎ( ‖ ‖ 1 ) ⊕ ℎ( ) and stores in his database, where is 's secret key.
Authentication
(1) generates a random number 2 and computes = ℎ( ‖ ‖ 1 ), = 2 , 1 = 2 , = ⊕ , and 2 = ℎ( ‖ ). Then, sends the message Table 2 ).
Password Change.
In this subsection, can change his password any time when he wants. chooses a new password , a new secret key , and a new random number 1 . Then the following process will be performed by and .
(1) submits the message ℎ(ℎ(
(2) computes ℎ(ℎ( ⊕ ℎ( )) ‖ ) and checks whether it is equal to the received ℎ(ℎ(
) ⊕ ⊕ ℎ( ) and then replaces with .
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, 1 ,
.
Analysis Security
In this section, we first adopt Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic [26] to demonstrate that the proposed scheme is working correctly by achieving the authentication goals. Then, we conduct a security analysis of the enhanced scheme through both the informal and formal analyses. [26] is a set of rules for defining and analyzing information exchange schemes. It helps its users determine whether exchanged information is trustworthy, secured against eavesdropping, or both. It has been highly successful in analyzing the security of authentication schemes [27, 28] . In this subsection, we prove that a session key between communicating parties can be correctly generated within authentication process using BAN logic. First, we introduce some notations and logical postulates of BAN logic that we will use in our scheme.
BAN Logic Notations

Verifying Authentication Scheme with BAN Logic. BAN logic
(1) BAN logical postulates the following. (2) Idealized scheme:
(3) Establishment of security goals:
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(4) Initiative premises: By analyzing the security of our scheme with BAN logic, the results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can effectively achieve the security goal of the mutual authentication of and .
Informal Security Analysis.
In this subsection, we will examine whether the enhanced scheme is safe and consider its ability to resist various known attacks. The following attacks are also based on the assumptions that a malicious adversary A has total control over the communication channel connecting and in authentication phase. So A can intercept, insert, delete, or modify any messages transmitted via public channel [22] [23] [24] .
User is Anonymous and Untraceable. Suppose A eavesdrops the request messages
( 1 , , 2 ), the challenge message ( , 3 , ℎ ), and the response message ( , ℎ ) from the public channel. To obtain from these values by means of guessing and verifying, A must have the knowledge of {{ , 1 , }, { 3 }, { 2 }}. Due to and compute different 1 and 3 with a new random number ( 1 , 2 ) and 3 for each session, and A is not able to trace who communicates with by monitoring the channel. This shows the proposed scheme provides the attribute of anonymous.
Insider Attack.
In our scheme, it is computationally impossible to derive the password from the = ℎ( ‖ ) because of the difficulties of hash function with the secret key of . Therefore, the proposed scheme can withstand the insider attack.
Perfect Forward Secrecy. If 's password
, the secret key , and 's secret key are all compromised, this does not allow A to determine the session key for the past session. A cannot compute 1 2 from 1 and 3 because of secure one-way hash function and ECDLP.
6.6. Mutual Authentication. In our scheme, and can authenticate each other by checking 2 , ℎ , and ℎ , separately. Therefore, our scheme can provide mutual authentication.
Key-Compromise Impersonation Attack.
Assume that A intercepts the request, the challenge, and the response messages. Supposing the secret key of is compromised by A, he cannot go through the verification process of as the random number 1 is not known. On the other hand, supposing the secret key of is compromised by A, he cannot impersonate to cheat . Since A cannot know the values of the identity and 1 of , he cannot compute the correct value and hence cannot be authenticated by . Therefore, the proposed scheme can withstand the keycompromise impersonation attack.
Replay Attack.
Assuming that A eavesdrops ( 1 , , 2 ) and replays it to impersonate , then verifies the condition 2 ? = ℎ( 2 ‖ ). The message verification does not hold, so try to guess 2 from is the ECDLP and 2 is different in each authentication message. On the other hand, suppose A eavesdrops ( , 3 , ℎ ) and replays it to impersonate . The replied message cannot pass the verification process ℎ = ℎ( ‖ ℎ( ‖ ‖ 1 ) ‖ 2 ), since both 1 and 2 are new random numbers chosen by in each session, and A has no control of it. Therefore, A has no opportunity to successfully replay used messages. 
Offline Password Guessing Attack. Even if
Accept the derived , , and as the correct and of the user (9) and the session key between and , respectively (10) return 1 (success) (11) else (12) return 0 (failure) (13) end if
Since A cannot know the values of the user's identity , the secret key , and the random number 1 , he cannot compute the value = ℎ( ‖ 1 ‖ ℎ( ‖ )) to verify the guessed password through the recorded messages. Therefore, our scheme can resist the offline password guessing attack.
Known Session Key Security.
Because of the randomness and independence of the generations of 1 and 3 in all the sessions, the session key = 1 3 of each session is independent of that of any other sessions. Therefore, the proposed scheme can ensure known session key security.
Formal Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme.
In this subsection, we provide the formal security analysis of our scheme and show that our scheme is secure. We first define the following oracles.
Reveal 1.
This random oracle will unconditionally output the input from the given hash value = ℎ( ).
Reveal 2.
This random oracle will unconditionally output from given points and = in an elliptic curve ( , ). Proof. The formal security proof of our scheme is similar to that as in [29] [30] [31] . A runs the experimental algorithm showed in Algorithm 1, ,A , for our robust, and efficient authentication scheme for session initiation protocol; say REASSIP.
Define the success probability for and . In this case, A will discover the complete connections between and . However, it is a computationally infeasible problem to invert the input from a given hash value and output from given points , ; that is, V
. Therefore, our scheme is probably secure against A for deriving , , and .
Security Properties and Performance Comparison
In this section, we show that our proposed scheme satisfies many security attributes and has lower computation cost. Security properties and performance cost comparisons between our scheme and the other related schemes in [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] are given in Table 3 and Figure 1 , respectively. Table 3 shows that our scheme is more secure than Arshad et al. 's scheme and other related schemes and achieves more functionality features. In performance comparison, we mainly focus on computations of the authentication phase, since it is the main body of an authentication scheme, and the registration phase only performs one time before authentication. Let PA, PM, INV, SE, M, and H be the time for performing an elliptic curve point addition, an elliptic curve point multiplication, a modular inversion, a symmetric key encryption or decryption, a modular multiplication, and a hash function. Since xor operations require very little computations, we omitted it. From Figure 1 we can see that our scheme has similar or better efficiency in comparison with other related ECC-based authentication schemes.
Conclusion
We have analyzed the security of a recently proposed Arshad et al. 's SIP authentication scheme. We have pointed out that [14] al. [19] al. [18] al. [17] an adversary can successfully launch the trace and keycompromise impersonation attacks on Arshad et al. 's scheme. We also have shown that Arshad et al. 's scheme does not achieve proper mutual authentication. The cryptanalysis of Arshad and Nikooghadam's scheme thus shows that the security of their scheme is compromised. In order to eliminate the security pitfalls found in Arshad et al. 's scheme, we have then presented a robust and efficient ECC based authentication scheme for SIP. Our scheme is immune to the trace, key-compromise impersonation, and insider attacks which Arshad and Nikooghadam's scheme fails to satisfy. Meanwhile, our scheme can withstand the replay, offline password guessing, and insider attacks. In addition, our scheme achieves the known session key security and perfect forward secrecy. We present a cryptanalysis of our scheme through both informal and formal security analyses. Besides, our scheme is computationally efficient as compared to other related ECC based SIP authentication schemes. Considering the security and efficiency provided by our scheme, we conclude that our scheme is more appropriate for practical applications in comparison with other related schemes.
